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Abstract 
 
 
McKinnon’s (1973) complementary hypothesis predicts that money and investment are 
complementary due to a self-financed investment, and that a real deposit rate is the key 
determinant of capital formation for financially constrained developing economies.  This 
paper critically appraises this contention by conducting a vigorous empirical approach by 
using panel data for 108 developing countries over the sample period of 1970-2006.  The 
long-run and dynamic estimation results based on McKinnon’s theoretical model are 
supportive of the hypothesis.  However, when the investment model is conditioned by such 
factors as financial development, different income levels across developing countries, 
external inflows, public finance and trade constraints, the credibility of the hypothesis has 
been undermined.   
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1. Introduction 
The assertion of self-financed capital formation for financially constrained developing 
economies led McKinnon (1973) to develop a complementary hypothesis whereby a high real 
return on money induces the accumulation of a real money balance, and this, in turn, finances 
the costly, indivisible fixed capital.  The hypothesis formulates a dual process, in which the 
demand for real money balances depends directly, inter alia, on the average real return on 
capital, and the investment ratio to GDP rises with the real deposit rate of interest.  This 
process provided a plausible empirical framework for researchers in analysing investment 
decisions and a demand for money function for developing countries.  Most literature 
engages in a single equation framework, either a money or an investment equation.  See, for 
example, DeMelo and Tybout (1986), Edwards (1988), Morriset (1993), which focused on 
the investment equation, and Harris (1979), Thornton and Poudyal (1990), who modelled a 
demand for money function.   The study of Fry (1978), Laumas (1990), Thornton (1990) and 
Khan and Hasan (1998) has tested the complementarity hypothesis by estimating both 
investment (or savings) and the demand for money functions. Pentecost and Moore (2006) 
investigated the interdependence between the investment and money legs of the joint 
hypothesis in a simultaneous system of equations for India.  In all, the coverage of a sample 
country is either single country or a group of several countries, and the empirical literature 
tends to support the complementary hypothesis.   
 This paper critically appraises McKinnon’s complementary hypothesis by conducting 
a vigorous empirical approach using panel data for 108 developing countries with the sample 
period of 1970 to 2006.  First, we test a panel cointegration for the key variables of money, 
investment, real return on money, aggregate income and credit.  The presence of 
cointegration is a pre-requisite for the acceptance of the hypothesis.  Then, the long run 
relationship is modelled in a panel system of equations, followed by an error correction 
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dynamic model.  We further extend the theoretical model by conditioning the investment 
behaviour by incorporating the effect of financial development, different income levels across 
developing countries, external inflows, trade constraints and public finance.  These variables 
are mostly predicted to raise the capital formation independently of the hypothesis.    
We find a cointegration relationship among the key variables, providing a necessary 
condition for the complementarity hypothesis.   The long-run and dynamic estimates are 
supportive, too, since we find a statistically significant effect of return on capital on the 
demand for money model, and also a significant positive impact of real deposit rates on 
investment.  Evidence reveals that financial development and the status of a middle-income 
level among developing economies are factors, which reduce self-financed capital formation 
by mitigating financial constraints.  The conditional variables are found to boost the economy 
by accumulating the physical capital independently of the self-finance hypothesis.  Although, 
even after augmenting the investment model with the conditional variables, real deposit rates 
are found to be statistically significant, the size of the coefficients is numerically too marginal 
to provide vital evidence of self-financed capital formation.  The empirical result highlights 
the key role of financial intermediation through the conduit of credit for increased capital 
formation. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, McKinnon’s (1973) 
complementarity hypothesis is specified. Section 3 describes the data employed for 
estimation, and Section 4 spells out the panel unit root and cointegration tests.  Long-run and 
dynamic models are estimated in Section 5.  In Section 6, the investment long-run model is 
augmented with conditional variables.  Section 7 concludes. 
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2. McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis 
McKinnon (1973) asserts self-finance and lump-sum expenditure or indivisibilities of  
investment for financially-constrained developing countries, hence investors are obliged to 
accumulate money balances prior to their investment project.  Meanwhile, in many 
developing countries, the decades of high budget deficits had resulted in high domestic 
borrowings by the government.  Government securities at low interest rates were one of the 
major causes of financial repression, where interest rates were set by administrative decision, 
which were likely to be below the market-determined levels (Fry 1980).  McKinnon 
emphasises that the removal or relaxation of the administered interest rates would boost 
capital formation, since the high deposit rates attract the accumulation of money, and 
stimulate investment.        
 The complementary hypothesis is examined using the dual models.  First, the demand 
for real money balances (M/P) depends positively upon real income, Y , the own real rate of 
interest on bank deposits, d - πe  (d = deposit rates and πe = expected rate of inflation), and the 
real average return on capital, c.  The positive association between the average real return on 
physical capital and the demand for money balances represents the complementarity between 
capital and money as given by (time scripts are omitted for simplicity). 
)d,c,Y(P/M eπ−Ψ=   000 >Ψ>Ψ>Ψ − edcY ,, π   (1) 
The equation (1) suggests that the demand for money is given not only by the transactions 
and speculative motive of holding cash but also by the need to finance real capital formation 
in countries, where institutional credit or alternative finance are constrained.  There is also the 
need to hedge against inflation in such a way as to preserve the real value of money balances.  
 The complementarity works in both directions: money supply has a first order impact 
in determining investment, hence the complementarity can be accomplished by specifying an 
investment function given by: 
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)d,c(FY/I eπ−=    00 >> − edr F,F π    (2) 
The investment to income ratio, I/Y, must be positively related to the real rate of return on 
money balances. This is because if a rise in the real return on bank deposits, d - πe   raises the 
demand for money, and real money balances are complementary to investment, it must also 
lead to a rise in the investment ratio.  The complementarity hypothesis specifically requires 
that  00 >>Ψ − edc Fand π 1.  
 McKinnon’s model is, however, restrictive in that it is assumed that there is no role of 
intermediation by financial institutions from saving (money includes current and time savings) to 
the creation of credit.  This is very unlikely even in under-developed financial markets.    
Since the indirect effect of real deposit rates on investment is due not only to self-finance, but 
also to the credit creation from money, where the real supply of credit increases pari passu 
money demand (Fry 1980).   Moreover, the level of credit may contain two types of 
information about the process of financial intermediation.  First, changes in credit may reflect an 
ability of financial intermediaries to make loans perhaps due to changes in monetary policy. In 
this case, firms, which are unable to obtain funds in the capital market may become credit-
constrained leading to lower levels of investment.   Second, changes in credit may reflect shocks 
to the intermediation system itself. In particular, financial liberalisation undertaken in many 
developing countries initiates  various forms of deregulations in financial markets, the creation 
of financial innovations, or changes in the solvency of borrowers or lenders, which has 
implications for economic activity that may be transmitted through changes in the quantity of 
credit (Mallick and Moore 2008).  In this respect, the availability of credit to business will 
affect the investment ratio independently of the self-finance motive of holding money, hence 
the variable of ‘credit’ is specified in the investment equation (2).  By specifying credit along 
                                                            
1 Shaw (1973) argues that complementarity has no place here because investors are not constrained to self-
finance.  Shaw had the debt-intermediation view by specifying a vector of real opportunity costs (real yields on 
all types of wealth) of holding money in equation (1). 
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with the real rates of deposit in the investment equation, the two channels of funding sources 
could be identified: one is self-finance portrayed by the effect of real deposit rates, and the 
other channel is through credit intermediated by financial institutions.    
 From an empirical perspective, since it is impossible to compute a sensible measure of 
the real return on physical capital, McKinnon (1973) suggests that it could be replaced by the 
investment to income ratio, I/Y, which is likely to vary directly with the average real return on 
capital (see also Pentecost and Moore 2006).  The models now become: 
),/,(/ edyiypm πψ −=       (3) 
),(/ dcdfyi eπ−=        (4) 
where m/p= ln(M/P), i/y=ln(I/Y) y=ln(Y/P) and dc is the ratio of domestic credit to private 
sector to GDP.  The models (3) and (4) form a basis for empirical estimation.   
 
3. Data 
The data set used to estimate models (3) and (4) are annual data of 108 developing countries 
covering the period 1970 to 2006.  The time series per country contain a minimum of 7 years 
in sequence.  See Appendix 1 for the detailed countries.  Note that the study covers more than 
70% of all developing countries, as a total of 149 countries are classified as developing 
countries based on 2006 GNI per capita.   
The broad money (M) includes money and quasi money (demand and time deposits), 
and the deposit rates (d) are the rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time, 
or savings deposits.  The consumer price index (p) is used as the deflator for nominal GDP 
(Y) and the broad money stock, and it is also used for inflation.  The capital formation for the 
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private sector (I) is derived from the gross fixed capital formation2.   All these data are taken 
from World Development Indicators.   
 Expected inflation in d-πe   is not directly observable.  For a volatile rate of inflation in 
developing economies, where the future prediction of the variable is extremely difficult, an 
autoregressive type of expectation seems to be reasonable3.  We take a naïve expectation, i.e. 
t
e
t ππ =+1 .  The descriptive statistics are found in Appendix 2.   
 
4. Panel unit root and cointegration tests 
The complementarity hypothesis predicts the linkage between money and investment, and 
that the dependent and independent variables in equations (3) and (4) are likely to form a 
stable long-run relationship.  Hence, we conduct a unit root and cointegration tests in this 
section.         
Unit root tests  
It is argued that Fisher’s ADF and PP tests proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999) would fit for 
unbalanced panel data.  Maddala and Wu (1999) assume individual unit root process, and 
combine the p-values from individual unit root tests.  The test statistics are the asymptotic   
We also conduct two other types of panel unit root tests, developed by Levin et al. (2002) and 
Im et al. (2003) for the robustness check.  Levin et al. (2002) assume that there is a common 
unit root process so that coefficients on the lagged dependent variables are homogeneous 
across cross-sections, though incorporates a degree of heterogeneity by allowing for fixed 
effects and unit specific time trends.  In contrast, Im et al. (2003) allow for heterogeneity of 
                                                            
2 The gross fixed capital formation includes plant, machinery, office, equipment purchases, private residential 
dwellings, commercial and industrial buildings and also the construction of roads, railways, schools and 
hospitals.  There is no data available exclusively for the private investment for many of these developing 
countries.  Hence, we take a ratio of private sector consumption expenditure to total consumption expenditure 
(private and government sectors), as a weight on the gross fixed capital formation to derive the private 
sectorinvestment.   
3 An earlier study by Khan (1988) found that the results were not sensitive to alternative expectations including 
perfect foresight, static expectations and adaptive expectations.   
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the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable with the slope coefficients to vary across 
cross-sections. The null is that all series are nonstationary, whilst the alternative is that at 
least one cross-section is stationary.  See Table 1 for the results. 
[Table 1 around here] 
The variables of m/p, dc and y in levels are found to be insignificant at the 5% level implying 
that they are non-stationary. The first difference of these variables rejects the null of unit 
root4.  It follows that these variables are characterised as integrated of order one, I(1).  The 
null is rejected for i/y and d-πe  in levels, hence they are stationary, I(0).     
 The unit root test result means that there are I(0) and I(1) mixed in analysing 
cointegrating relationship.  The presence of some I(0) variables in the regressions does not vitiate 
the test for cointegration.  I(0) variables might play a key role in establishing a long-run 
relationship between I(1) variables, in particular, if theory a priori indicates that such I(0) 
variables should be included 5.   
 
Panel cointegratin test  
The cointegration test is conducted for the five variables of m/p, y, i/y, dc and d-πe.  Since we 
are analyzing the cointegrating properties of a n >2 dimensional vector of I(1) variables, in 
which up to n-1 linearly independent cointegration  vectors are possible.  Hence, the Johansen 
cointegration test is appropriate.  Fisher (1932) derives a combined test that uses the results of 
the individual independent tests.  Maddala and Wu (1999) extend the Fisher’s test by 
developing a Johansen panel cointegration test, which combines tests from individual cross-
sections for the full panel.  If ωi  is the p-value from an individual cointegration test for cross- 
section i, then under the null hypothesis for the panel, we have . 
  [Table 2 around here] 
                                                            
4 Note that Levin et al. (2002) suggests that y and m/p in levels are significant at the 5% level, implying the 
variables is I(0).  Yet, the Im et al. (2003) and Fisher tests are not rejected, and that we  treat  them as I(1). 
5I(0) variables may contribute to a sensible long-run relationship among I(1) variables (Harris, 1995). 
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The test result is shown in Table 2.  The trace and maximum eigenvalue tests suggest that 
there are 4 cointegrating vectors at the conventional significance level.  Note that the 
inclusion of I(0) variables (i.e. i/y and d-πe ) increases the number of cointegration vectors, 
since each I(0) variable is stationary by itself, and it forms a linearly independent 
combination of the variables, which is stationary6.  The presence of cointegration suggests 
that there is a long-run stable relationship existing amongst these variables.  If the real deposit 
rates affect money, which in turn affect credit, hence investment, then the cointegration 
relationship is a conventional standard result.  If there is a direct effect of money on the 
formation of physical capital, the presence of cointegration is a prerequisite for the 
complementarity hypothesis7.      
 
5. Long- run and dynamic error-correction model 
Long-run model 
In panel estimations, the existence of unobservable determinants can be decomposed into a 
country-specific term and a common term to developing countries.  The unobservable 
country-specific determinants can be taken into account in the estimation procedure, and the 
models (3) and (4) respectively become:  
m/p it = ßi,0 +  ß1yi,t+ ß2i/yit + ß3 (d-πe)it + εit     (5) 
i/y it = αi,0 +  α1  (d-πe)it + α2  dcit +  εit     (6) 
                                                            
6 Dickey et al. (1994) argue that cointegration vectors may represent constraints on the movement of the 
variables in the system in the long-run, and consequently, the more cointegrating vectors there are, the more 
stable the system is.   
7 Some empirical literature finds cointegration (see Table 4 in this paper) and claims it as compelling evidence 
of the complementarity hypotheses.  This overrates the finding.   
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ßi,0  and αi,0  are a  time-invariant individual country effect term and εit is an error term8.  It is 
possible that country specific terms improved the estimates by absorbing country specific 
errors and  reducing heteroskedasticity. 
The cross-country regressions are subject to endogeneity problems.  For example, the 
correlation between real deposit rates and money could arise from an endogenous 
determination of real rates, that is, real rates themselves may be influenced by innovations in 
the stochastic process governing the variable of money.  Also any omitted factors may 
increase both real rates and money simultaneously.   In these circumstances there would exist 
a correlation between real deposit rates and the country-specific error terms in equation (5), 
which would bias the estimated coefficients.  The endogeneity problem can be mitigated by 
applying instrument variable (IV) techniques.  A good instrument would be a variable which 
is highly correlated with regressors,  but not with the error terms.  We use the lagged values 
of regressors and dependent variables in each equation.   Besides, money is included as an 
instrument variable in the investment equation, and credit is in the money equation.  This is 
not only due to the complementarity consideration, but also to the following reasons:  Under 
disequilibrium financial conditions, where real deposit rates could be administered, being 
below equilibrium level, real credit supply is determined by real money demand and there is 
likely to be little direct feedback mechanism from investment demand to real credit.  As there 
is limited supply (of savings), the volume of investment is determined solely by conditions of 
supply.  In this respect, the use of money, as an instrument variable deals with any 
simultaneous equation bias in the investment estimate.    However, where interest rate ceilings 
are relaxed or removed, a larger demand for investible funds will elicit an increase in quantity 
                                                            
8 The period effects are found to be insignificant by the likelihood ratio test, therefore we do not specify the 
period dummy.  It is possible that the regressors may capture some of the shifts in the economy over the sample 
period.  In the next section, when the model is augmented, such period effects are likely to be subsumed in the 
controlled variables, hence there is not much concern.   
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supplied through higher returns to savers.  This consideration dictates the inclusion of credit 
as an instrument variable in the money equation. 
By using the IV techniques, we estimate the models in two ways: one is in a single 
equation framework, where money and investment are modelled separately, and the other is 
in a system of simultaneous equations, where both equations are simultaneously estimated.  
The estimates of the long-run models are shown in Table 3.  An estimator that uses lags as 
instruments under the assumption of white noise errors would lose its consistency if, in fact, 
the errors were serially correlated.  It is, therefore, essential to satisfy oneself that this is not 
the case by reporting test statistics of the validity of the instrument variables.  We present the 
first and second order residual serial correlation coefficients and the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions together with the Breusch-Pagan-Godfray heteroskedasticity test.  We 
also conduct the residual-based panel coingegration test of Pedroni (1999, 2004) and Kao 
(1999) for each single equation (see Appendix 3 for the specification).  It is shown in Table 3 
that these residual tests are, in general, satisfactory, and the evidence of stationarity of the 
residuals seems to steer clear of ‘spurious’ regression.        
[Table 3 around here] 
The signs of all the coefficients agree with a priori expectations with a statistical 
significance, except for the real deposit rate in the system of money equation, which fails to 
reach the 5% significance level.  In the money model, the magnitude of the coefficients tends 
to be larger in the single equation, as compared with that in the system equation.  The 
investment model shows a remarkably similar size of coefficients between the system and 
single equations.   
 The positive relationship of the demand for money with the level of aggregate income 
accords with the transactions demand for money hypothesis.  The sizes of the coefficient at 
0.86 and 1.37 in the system and single equations respectively are quite plausible, being 
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similar to those found in the empirical literature on the demand for money for developing 
economies9.  The positive impact of  the investment income ratio on money supports the 
assumption of self-finance and indivisibility.  Thus where self-finance is important, a rise in 
i/y increases rather than decreases m/p.  The estimated coefficient suggests that one 
percentage point increase in the investment ratio would increase the real money stock by 
about 0.20 to 0.13 percentage points.  In the investment model, it is evident that the 
availability of credit raises the investment ratio, and the positive relationship with d-πe 
highlights the importance of high real rates of interest for capital accumulation.  A crucial 
finding is the significant positive sign on i/y in the money function and d-πe in the investment 
function, which provide robust empirical support for the complementarity hypothesis 
according to McKinnon’s (1973) theory.   
 Financial repression is deemed to be the holding of institutional interest rates, 
particularly of deposit rates of interest, below their market equilibrium levels.  Our empirical 
evidence reveals that under disequilibrium interest rate conditions, higher deposit rates raise 
capital formation via the increase in real money balances, where money is defined broadly to 
include savings.  The supply of credit is also due to the increased deposit rates, yet if there is 
a credit control prevalent10 and if we also consider such factors as external inflows and 
international trade in developing economies, there is a limitation in treating it as solely a 
direct consequence of the increased rates11.  In this respect, the positive influence of deposit 
rates on investment is instinctive in terms of the self-financed fixed capital, and proves to be 
a credible  sign of the complementarity hypothesis.  
[Table 4 around here] 
                                                            
9 See the selected studies in Table 11 in Moore et al. (2005) for the income elasticities of the demand for money.  
10 The monetary authorities may generate new credit independently of domestic saving often in response to 
government policy. 
11 The supply of real credit is also determined by the balance of payments situation (Leff and Sato 1980) .    
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For a comparative study, we present selected studies of the complementarity 
hypothesis in Table 4, where the elasticities of level feedback are available in a similar model 
specification to that of this paper.  The income elasticity (y) ranges from 0.45 to 1.17 in the 
literature and our estimates are quite comparable.  The real deposit rate elasticity is relatively 
small with at 0.00152 in m/p model, which is closer to that of Khan and Hasan (1998).  The 
interest rate elesticity is much smaller in the i/y model at around 0.00023.  Such a low 
magnitude is again found for Pakistan at 0.0009 by Khan and Hasan (1998).  The study of 
Fry (1978) rejects the complementarity hypothesis since domestic saving is found to be 
negative for seven of the less developed countries (LDCs) in Asia in a pooled demand for 
money regression12. 
Dynamic error correction model  
In order to ascertain credibility of the long-run estimates, we investigate the dynamic 
behaviour of the demand for money and investment.  Dynamic modelling in a system of 
equations is, however, not practically plausible with the small sample size in terms of time 
series relative to the number of explanatory variables: for example, the total of sixteen 
variables with one lag for each explanatory variable are to be simultaneously solved.  Also 
given the fact that there is not a sizeable difference in estimates between the system and 
single equations in Table 3 in the long-run model, we estimated the dynamic model in a 
single equation with the IV technique.     
[Table 5 around here] 
Tables 5 presents the dynamic, error correction model, where the lagged error correction 
terms (et-1) which are the residuals taken from the single equation of the long-run model, are 
specified along with the other explanatory variables by taking one lag for each.  The 
                                                            
12 Fry (1978) specified domestic saving in the place of investment on the ground that a self-financed hypothesis 
excluded foreign saving.   
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respective error correction terms are found to be highly significant in each equation with the 
correct negative sign, indicating the appropriateness of the identified long-run relationships. 
 The explanatory variables are statistically and theoretically well-determined in the 
money equation: the level feedback from income, investment and real rates of interest is 
correctly signed.  The negative impact from the lagged deposit rates on the real money 
balance may be interpreted as the adjustment effect.  In the case of the investment function, 
again the level feedback is statistically significant with a correct sign.  The size of the 
coefficient on the real interest rates is halved to 0.00011 when compared with that in the 
long-run.  The overall results appear to strengthen those of the long-run model.   
 
6.  Augmented investment model 
In the seminal work of McKinnon’s (1973) complementarity hypothesis, government fiscal 
action has little role in affecting directly aggregate capital accumulation, since the public 
policy is limited to the control of the real return on holding money, i.e. (d-πe).  Further 
restrictions apply to the simplified assumptions about investment in small self-financing 
domestic enterprises.  The models described are also derived from the assumptions of a 
closed economy, even though empirical materials are usually drawn from small open 
economies, and so their rates of capital formation are unlikely to be determined solely by tiny 
self-financing units.  Virtually, many developing countries are highly dependent on foreign 
trade and are open to corporate investment from abroad.  Hence, a rise in investment may not 
be always due to a rise in the saving ratio when foreign trade or foreign capital flows are 
brought into the picture.  McKinnon (1973) also fails to take account of the effect of financial 
development and the different income levels across countries, as these are treated as constant.     
We relax these assumptions or restrictions by augmenting the long-run investment models 
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with several factors, which are likely to contribute to the share of financing in domestic 
capital formation.   
 Firstly, we consider financial development, which develops financial innovations and 
deregulates some restrictions in the capital market widening the scope for alternative 
investment opportunities, and also removes barriers to foreign banks.  This is likely to impact 
on the transmission mechanism between deposit rates and investment.  As a proxy variable, 
we explicitly include the development of stock market and a broad money13.  The latter may 
represent financial sector deepening 14 .  Secondly, the model is designed to reflect the 
different levels of income across developing countries.  Depending on the level of 
institutional capability, the bureaucratic efficiency, technological capability and the quality of 
labour, deposit rates may affect investment differently. Assuming that these factors are, 
though in a crude manner, subsumed in the level of income, the estimation is conducted by 
taking dummy variables for the two income groups of low and upper-middle countries to see 
if there is any difference in the linkage15.   
 Thirdly, external flows such as FDI (foreign direct investment) and ODA (official 
development assistance)  are likely to affect capital formation independently of the level of 
real deposit rates.   Foreign capital takes various forms.  FDI implies long-term investment 
consisting of not only capital per se, but also management skill, know-how and technology, 
and FDI transmits technological diffusion from the developed countries to the developing 
countries raising capital formation (Balasubramanyam et al. 1999 and Borensztein et al. 
1998).   Short-term foreign capital flows include portfolio investment and foreign bank 
lending.  FDI is specified separately from the short-term foreign loans, since the latter depend 
                                                            
13 The variable of credit is combined with these variables, so that they capture the financial development in a 
wider range.  
14 One may prefer to hold monetary assets only when it is felt convenient to keep ones’ wealth in monetary 
instruments with an underlying nature of liquidity, risk, return and efficiency in payment.  Such types of 
instruments are offered by a better developed financial sector. 
15 In the preliminary result, the lower-middle income countries performs poorly, hence we concentrate on low 
and upper-middle income groups.     
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on the development of the domestic financial market, thus it is assumed to be captured 
through the variable of credit 16 .  ODA includes aid or concessional funds from such 
institutions as the IMF and the World Bank, and distinguishes itself from FDI, therefore ODA 
makes a separate entry to the model.  Fourthly, we address the extent to which the public 
spending is transmitted into capital and production17.  We condition the investment decision 
in the private sector involving the improvement of infrastructure or purchase of public 
capital18.       
 Lastly, some attention is paid by the literature to the foreign trade constraint to 
economic growth.  Openness and trade policy are important for productivity spill-over and 
the cost of capital goods.  More open economies have experienced faster productivity growth 
(Edwards 1998 and Diao et al. 2005), and developing countries can boost their productivity 
by importing a larger variety of intermediate products and capital equipment which embody 
foreign knowledge (Coe et al. 1997).  A variable of the foreign trade is  added as a 
conditional instrument.   
The augmented investment model is now given by: 
),,(/ vdcdfyi eπ−=         (7) 
where v  is the vector of additional explanatory variables:  fdit (financial development), fdiit 
(FDI), odait (ODA) , git (government expenditure) , tradeit (foreign trade)  and income dummy 
for a low and upper-middle income groups. fd and income dummy are specified as an 
interaction with the real deposit rates.  Financial development is the sum of the three ratios of 
stock market capitalization, M2 and domestic credit to GDP.  FDI,  ODA, foreign trade, and 
government expenditure are also all percentage of GDP.   The country-income groups can be 
                                                            
16 See, for example, Bosworth and Collins (1999) for justification. 
17 For example, Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2007) argue that the effectiveness of foreign capital on investment 
depends on the condition of the public finance.   
18 In some developing countries, much of the government expenditure could be allocated to government 
consumption or defence, rather than productive projects, and if this is stronger, public expenditure would have a 
negative impact on private investment.     
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found in Appendix 2.  The data are all retrieved from the World Development Indicator.  The 
estimation is conducted by the IV model with a country-specific dummy.     
[Table  6  around here] 
Empirical results are reported in Table 619.   The coefficient on the interaction of deposit 
rates with financial development in Model 1 is negative.  As the scope for obtaining funds 
from capital markets increases, reliance on self-finance may be curtailed.  In Model 2 and 3, 
the interaction between the real deposit rate and the upper-middle income group is shown to 
be negative, whereas that for the low-income countries is positive.  This implies that as the 
status of a developing country moves from the low to the middle income group, there is less 
self-finance in investment.  These results are not surprising and explain why some empirical 
literature rejects the hypothesis.  For example, Fry (1978) finds that  money is not the only 
financial repository of domestic saving for the seven Asian semi-industrial LDCs.  This is 
because these countries have achieved stages of financial development well beyond the phase 
in which the complementarity assumptions predominate20.  Similarly, in the  empirical work 
for 25 Asian and Latin American LDCs, Gupta (1984) did not find a strong support for the 
complemetarity hypothesis.  It is noted that some of the major Latin American countries in 
Gupta’s study are classified as being in the upper-middle income bracket.  
 The impact of FDI and ODA  in Model 4 also accords with a priori expectations, 
indicating that as the external flow increases the amount of investment is raised, being 
independent of the complementarity hypothesis21.  Note that the effect of ODA on capital 
formation is weak, as the coefficient is not significant.  Generally, in order for ODA to affect 
output most effectively, countries need to be equipped with reasonably developed institutions 
                                                            
19 The models, in general, tend to suffer a first-order serial correlation at the 5% level, but it is  not rejected  at  
the 1% level.  The second-order serial correlation is not rejected at the 5% level in all cases. 
 
20 In Fry’s (1978) study, three out of the seven countries are not even categorised as developing countries now.   
21 Empirically, the impact of FDI on economic growth has remained controversial.  Our results are in line with 
e.g. Blomstrom et al. (1996), Balasubramanyan et al. (1999) and Borensztein et al. (1998), who observe a 
positive impact.   
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and legal systems.  Moreover, aid could be often misallocated into financing personal 
consumption expenditure by the government or reserve accumulation (in particular  when the 
exchange rates are fixed), rather than increasing productive capital formation.  These factors 
may, in part, explain the insignificant effect of ODA.  Public finance (Model 5) and trade 
openness (Model 6) had a positive significant impact.   
 The robust finding is that d-πe is statistically significant, even when the investment 
model is conditioned.  It is, however, worth noting that there is a sharp fall in the magnitude 
of the coefficient, when such factors as external flows, trade and public finance are specified 
in the model.  Meanwhile, the size of the coefficient on the credit remains to be robust, e.g. 
the coefficients of 0.0015 and 0.0013 in Model 4 and 5 respectively in Table 6 are similar to 
0.0014 in Table 3.  The real rate of return on money matters in the creation of investment 
opportunities due to a self-financed capital formation, however, given the numerically small 
coefficient, the complementarity hypothesis is of very limited value.   
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has extensively tested McKinnon’s complementarity hypothesis for 108 
developing countries using panel cointegration and IV econometric techniques.  The 
empirical results reported, show that the real rate of interest has a positive effect on money 
and investment, hence McKinnon’s stress on the importance of financial conditions in the 
development process is justified.  Our result substantiates the earlier findings for individual 
countries for self-financed capital formation.  However, at the same time, we find that the 
influence of the real deposit rate on capital formation is numerically marginal, and its’ effect 
fades when the investment model is augmented with conditional variables.  It is also found 
that the complemetarity is not supported in the middle-income group of countries, or when a 
country reaches a certain stage of financial market development.  In this respect, one may 
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have to look much farther down the development ladder, well below the middle-income level 
of developing economies to the world’s least developed countries for recognising the 
complementary theory.   
The evidence highlights the strength of the credit link with the role of financial 
intermediation.  Under the disequilibrium interest rate system characterising most developing 
countries, a decline in the real deposit rate of interest reduces real money demand, which 
affects real credit supply, and this, in turn, squeezes new fixed investment.  In either self-
financed or bank-loan financed capital formation, the real rate of return on money greatly 
matters in raising the formation of capital.  The central banks for developing economies 
should continue to ensure a policy aimed at changing negative real interest rates to positive 
levels, or improve the positive rates in order to secure greater levels of investment. 
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Appendix 1   108 developing countries (out of total 149) used for the empirical analysis 
Low-income economies (40) 
Bangladesh  India  Rwanda  
Benin  Kenya  Senegal  
Burkina Faso  Kyrgyz Republic  Sierra Leone  
Burundi  Lao PDR  Solomon Islands  
Cambodia  Madagascar  Sudan  
Central African Republic  Malawi  Tanzania  
Chad  Mali  Togo  
Congo, Dem. Rep  Mauritania  Uganda  
Côte d'Ivoire  Mozambique  Vietnam  
Ethiopia  Myanmar  Yemen, Rep.  
Gambia, The  Niger  Zambia  
Ghana  Nigeria  Zimbabwe  
Guinea-Bissau  Pakistan   
Haiti  Papua New Guinea   
Lower-middle-income economies (38) 
Albania  Ecuador  Morocco 
Algeria  Egypt, Arab Rep.  Nicaragua  
Armenia  El Salvador  Paraguay  
Azerbaijan  Fiji  Peru  
Belarus  Georgia  Philippines  
Bhutan  Guatemala  Sri Lanka  
Bolivia  Guyana  Swaziland  
Cameroon  Honduras  Syrian Arab Republic  
Cape Verde  Indonesia  Thailand  
China  Jordan  Tunisia  
Colombia  Lesotho  Ukraine  
Congo, Rep.  Macedonia, FYR  Vanuatu  
Dominican Republic  Moldova    
Upper-middle-income economies (30) 
Argentina  Grenada  Russian Federation  
Belize  Hungary  Serbia  
Botswana  Latvia  Seychelles  
Brazil  Libya  Slovak Republic  
Bulgaria  Lithuania  South Africa  
Chile  Malaysia  St. Kitts and Nevis  
Costa Rica  Mauritius  St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines  
Croatia  Mexico  Turkey  
Dominica   Panama Uruguay  
Gabon Poland Venezuela, RB  
 
Economies are divided according to 2006 GNI per capita,. Low income countries ($905 or less) 40 out of 53, 
Lower-middle income countries ($906-$3,595) 38 out of 55 countries and upper-middle income countries 
($3,596 -$11,115) 30 out of 41 countries (World Development Indicator). 
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Appendix 2   Descriptive statistics 
 m/p i/y dc y d-πe 
 Mean 20.973 -1.576 34.299 25.593 -21.627
 Median 21.388 -1.571 24.672 26.023 0.769
 Maximum 29.688 -0.193 234.180 35.154 6449.490
 Minimum 14.145 -3.251 -72.994 0.595 -23754.040
 Std. Dev. 2.981 0.411 34.474 3.477 634.004
 
Sample period 1970-2006 with 108 countries.  Observations 2078.  The minimum real  
Deposit rate records at -23754 percent, which is due to the Congo Democratic Republic in 1994.   
 
Appendix 3   Residual-based cointegration 
Pedroni (1999 and 2004) proposes to allow for heterogeneous intercepts and trend 
coefficients across cross-sections.  The residuals test involves as given by: 
       (a1) 
For i = 1,……N,  N=108.  There are two alternative hypotheses in Pedroni’s test: the 
homogenous alternative, (ρ i  = ρ) < 1 for all i, and the heterogeneous alternative, ρ i  <1 for 
all i.  The asymptotic distributions for the statistics can be expressed in the form of  
N
v
Nk TN ⇒− μ, (0, 1) where TNk ,  is a standardized form with respect to the values of N 
and T for each statistic, and the μ  (mean) and v (variance) are functions of the moments of 
the underlying Brownian motion.  The statistics are then compared to the appropriate tails of 
the normal distribution.  The Kao’s (1999) test follows a similar approach to that of 
Pedroni’s, but specifies cross-section specific intercepts and homogeneous coefficients across 
cross-sections, and sets all of the trend coefficients to be zero.  The residual test is the pooled 
specification:  
       (a2) 
Kao’s statistics can be shown as given by  . 
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Table 1     Panel Unit Root tests  
 
 
Levin et.al (2002) Im et al. (2003) ADF - Fisher Chi-
square 
PP - Fisher Chi-
square 
obs. 
 
obs 
(PP) 
 statistic Prob. statistic Prob. statistic Prob. statistic Prob.   
m/p -1.683 0.046 5.158 0.999 182.960 0.950 177.054 0.975 2854 3018 
∆m/p -26.021 0.000 -30.119 0.000 1311.420 0.000 1857.290 0.000 2790 2902 
dc 2.734 0.997 1.668 0.952 272.902 0.005 235.950 0.168 2994 3161 
∆dc -32.598 0.000 -30.088 0.000 1313.570 0.000 1769.660 0.000 2912 3042 
y -2.133 0.016 8.077 0.999 177.126 0.975 152.436 0.999 3237 3418 
∆y -23.981 0.000 -26.890 0.000 1201.270 0.000 1417.810 0.000 3181 3308 
d-πe -1177.36 0.000 -173.752 0.000 1032.050 0.000 890.065 0.000 2226 2310 
i/y -4.246 0.000 -5.947 0.000 380.429 0.000 285.906 0.001 2630 2775 
 
Null: unit root.  Selection of lags based on Akaike information criterion: 0 to 8.  Obs: observation. 
 
Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi -square distribution. All other tests assume  
 
asymptotic normality. 
 
 
Table 2     Panel cointegration test of 5 variables: m/p, y, i/y, dc and d-πe     
 
Johansen Fisher panel test Trace test Prob. 
Max-eigen 
test Prob. 
None 1447 0.000 898.2 0.000 
At most 1 791.5 0.000 528.5 0.000 
At most 2 439.6 0.000 323.1 0.000 
At most 3 245.8 0.000 218.7 0.000 
At most 4 151.8 0.059 151.8 0.059 
 
Unrestricted cointegration rank test  
  value based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values for Johansen's cointegration trace test and  
maximum eigenvalue test. 
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Table 3  Long-run IV model: System and single equations  
Dependent var. System Single Dependent Var. System Single 
m/p Coef s.e. Coef s.e. i/y Coef s.e. Coef s.e. 
Constant -1.00536*** 0.27959 -14.0109*** 1.78356 Constant -1.58796*** 0.01477 -1.62029*** 0.01998 
y 0.86248*** 0.01049 1.37302*** 0.06854 d-πe   0.00024* 0.00014 0.00023*** 0.00007 
i/y  0.20202** 0.08091  0.13103* 0.07530 dc 0.00141*** 0.00031 0.00148*** 0.00053 
d-πe 0.00071 0.00056 0.00152*** 0.00026      
R2 0.717  0.934   0.530  0.609  
Breusch-God 
(order=1) 6.22733†  0.97054   4.1847  0.3904  
Breusch-God. 
(order=2) 5.36868  0.91578   3.2864  0.3258  
Breusch-Pagan 12.93306†  3.2064   8.0534  5.6974  
Sargan  4.58579  1.0101   5.5715  1.8570  
In the system of question, m/p and i/y models are simultaneously estimated by the maximum likelihood estimation. 
*, ** and *** Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.   
Instrument variables in t-1: m/p, y, i/y, d-πe and dc for m equation and m/p, dc, i/y and d-πe for i/y equation.  
χ2  tests for Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation (AR), Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey hetroskedasticity, and Sargan over-identification.   † indicate significant at the 5% level.  
Where heteroskedasticiy is found, it is corrected by estimating the White heteroskedastiticy-adjusted standard errors. 
Residual-based cointegration test  m/p model i/y  model 
 Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Pedroni rho-statistics (Common AR coefs., weighted statistics) 10.84768 0.000 9.708027 0.000 
Pedroni rho-statistics (Individual AR coefs.) 15.26696 0.000 13.87630 0.000 
Kao Test  -6.090196 0.000 -2.150274 0.000 
Residuals are taken from single equations.  AR: autoregressive.  See Appendix 2 for the detailed specification for the tests. 
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Table 4     Selected studies of the complementary demand for money in developing economies: Elasticities 
 Countries Period  
(annual data) 
Model y d-πe i/y Estimation Methodology 
Table 3  108 LDCs 
Panel data 
1970-2006 m/p 0.86248 0.00071 0.20202 System IV 
“   m/p 1.37302 0.00152 0.13102 Single IV 
“   i/y  0.00023  System IV 
“   i/y  0.00023  Single IV 
Pentecost and 
Moore (2006) 
India 1951-1999 m/p 0.448 0.057 0.683 System, Cointegration found 
 “   i/y  0.004  System, Cointegration found 
Odhiambo 
(2005) 
South Africa  m/p 0.45484 0.0106 0.19891 * OLS, Dynamic level feedback 
Khan and 
Hasan (1998) 
Pakistan 1951/60-
1994/95 
m/p 1.02 0.0015 § 1.97 * OLS, Cointegration found 
“   m/p 1.07 0.003   § 1.39 OLS, Cointegration found 
“   i/p  0.0005 §  OLS, Cointegration found 
Laumas 
(1990) 
India 1954/55-
19971/72 
m/p 
 
0.143 0.09   § 72.343  § System IV 
Time deposit instead of money 
“   i/y  0.014  System IV 
Thornton and 
Poudyal 
(1990) 
Nepal 1974/75-
1986/87 
m/p 1.1734 -0.0137 0.0708 * Single IV 
Thornton 
(1990) 
India 1964-1984 m/p 0.9235 -0.0039 1.0642 * Single IV 
Fry (1978) 7 Asian 
countries** 
1962-1972 
 
m/p 0.664 1.883 -0.752 * 
 
Pooled regression 
Reject the hypothesis 
 
*   Domestic saving (sd/y) specified instead of investment.  IV: Instrumental variables. 
 
* *Burma 1962-69, India 1962-72, Korea 1962-72, Malaysia 1963-72, Philippines 1962-72, Singapore 1965-72 and Taiwan 1962-72 
 
§  Insignificant at the 5% level. 
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Table 5  Error correction dynamic model: IV model 
 
Dependent var.: 
Δ(m/p) coef s.e. 
Dependent var.: 
Δ(i/y) Coef. s.e. 
Constant 0.02309*** 0.00545 Constant -0.008 0.00656 
et-1 -0.03544*** 0.00691 et-1 -0.30313*** 0.03421 
Δ(m/p)t-1 -0.06139*** 0.02356 Δ (i/y)t-1 0.10503** 0.04228 
Δy 0.58885*** 0.08553 Δ (d-πe) 0.00011*** 2.59E-05 
Δyt-1 0.33886*** 0.08501 Δ (d-πe)t-1 2.80E-05* 1.72E-05 
Δi/y 0.08027*** 0.02417 Δdc 0.02465*** 0.00492 
Δi/yt-1 0.01303 0.02369 Δdct-1 -0.00439*** 0.00171 
Δ (d-πe) 3.31E-05*** 7.03E-06    
Δ (d-πe)t-1 -1.60E-05** 6.79E-06    
R2 0.200   0.407  
Breusch-God. 
(order=1) 3.3344   0.1766  
Breusch-God. 
(order=2) 0.6711   0.4345  
Breusch-Pagan 3.3344   3.8162  
Sargan 4.7815   5.7098  
 
*, ** and *** Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  Instrument variables in t-3and t-4 in levels: m/p, y, i/y  
d-πe and dc in Δ(m/p) equation and m/p, dc, i/y and d-πe in  Δ (i/y) equation.  
χ2  tests for Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation, Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey hetroskedasticity, and Sargan over-
identification, (none is significant at the 5% level). 
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Table 6   IV estimates of the augmented investment model: dependent variable i/y 
 Model 1 s.e. Model 2 s.e. Model 3 s.e. 
Constant -1.72109*** 0.0454 -1.62138*** 0.01966 -1.61765*** 0.03055 
d-πe 0.00145*** 0.00025 0.00019*** 7.23E-05 0.00103*** 0.00016 
dc 0.00352*** 0.0010 0.00159*** 0.00053   0.00182* 0.00081 
d-πe *fd -1.46E-05*** 2.56E-06     
d-πe *low   0.00159*** 0.00045   
d-πe *middle     -0.00147*** 0.000217 
R2 0.243  0.619  0.086   
Breusch-God. 
(order=1) 2.1776  5.9959†  2.1653  
Breusch-God. 
(order=2) 2.5080  5.4203  2.1288  
Breusch-Pagan 6.9663  0.9848  14.4229†  
Sargan  2.1441  5.7074  4.4414  
 
 
 Model 4 s.e. Model 5 s.e. Model 6 s.e. 
Constant -1.67824*** 0.020046 -1.78968*** 0.03807 -1.99374*** 0.04847 
d-πe 2.00E-05*** 6.92E-06 1.77E-05** 7.48E-06 1.36E-05** 6.05E-06 
dc 0.00155*** 0.000417 0.00135*** 0.00043 0.00062 0.00042 
fdi 1.27573*** 0.218223 1.33498*** 0.21896 1.17805*** 0.20679 
oda 0.26410 0.169914     0.19999 0.16980     0.18544 0.17085 
g        0.00842*** 0.00245 0.01004*** 0.00251 
trade         0.00282*** 0.00040 
R2 0.660  0.664  0.671   
Breusch-God. 
(order=1) 5.23996†  5.20051†  5.16244†  
Breusch-God. 
(order=2) 5.59462  5.53628  5.49637  
Breusch-Pagan 6.10256  6.04441  6.21266  
Sargan  5.77780  5.66340  5.35554  
 
*, ** and *** Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Instrument variables in t-1: m/p, i/y and all regressors in each model.   χ2  tests for Breusch-Godfrey serial 
correlation, Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey hetroskedasticity, and Sargan over-identification.  † indicate significant at 
the 5% level.  Where heteroskedasticiy is found, it is corrected by estimating the White heteroskedastiticy-
adjusted standard errors.   χ2 (1) critical value: 3.84(5%) 6.64(1%)  
 
 
 
